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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction to review a decision of the Appeals Board of the
Utah Labor Commission (Appeals Board). Utah Code §§ 34A-1-303, 63G-4-403,
78A-4-103.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Issue 1: The Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act mandates that a
Citation be sent via "certified mail" to an employer. UOSH used a commercial
carrier service, Federal Express, a form of certified mail to deliver the citation. Did
the Appeals Board err in holding that "certified mail" as used in the statute did not
require the use of"Certified Mail" a trademarked term of the U.S. Postal Service?
Standard of Review: The Court reviews an agency's interpretation and
application of the law for clear error. Utah Code § 63 G-4-403(4)( d); Murray v.
Utah Labor Comm 'n, 2013 UT 38, ,I 17, 308 P.3d 461.

Statement of Preservation: Kuhni preserved this issue in the proceedings
below. R. 63-64, 94, 96, 143-47.
Issue 2: Due process requires that the form of Citation and Notification of
Penalty used by the Utah Labor Commission, Occupational Safety and Health
Division reasonably convey to employers their 30-day right to contest. The
Citation and Notification of Penalty at issue here was a fifteen-page document,
with language on the first page of the first paragraph directing the reader to a

1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

specific section of the document, on pages three and four, for information on how
to file a Notice of Contest. Did the Appeals Board err in concluding that the Labor
Commission's notice was clear and unambiguous?
Standard of Review: The Court reviews an agency's interpretation and
application of the law for clear error. Utah Code§ 63G-4-403(4)(d); Murray, 2013
UT 38, if 17.

Statement of Preservation: Kuhni preserved this issue in the proceedings
below. R. 63-67 94, 96-98, 143-49.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Code § 34A-6-303( 1):
(a)
If the division issues a citation under Subsection 34A-6-302(1),
it shall within a reasonable time after inspection or investigation,
notify the employer by certified mail of the assessment, if any,
proposed to be assessed under Section 34A-6-307 and that the
employer has 30 days to notify the Division of Adjudication that the
employer intends to contest the citation, abatement, or proposed
assessment.
(b)
If, within 30 days from the receipt of the notice issued by the
division, the employer fails to notify the Division of Adjudication that
the employer intends to contest the citation, abatement, or proposed
assessment, and no notice is filed by any employee or representative
of employees under Subsection (3) within 30 days, the citation,
abatement, and assessment, as proposed, is final and not subject to
review by any court or agency.

2
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is about an administrative citation issued by the Utah Labor
Commission, Occupational Safety and Health Division (UOSH) against Kuhni for
a workplace incident which resulted in the serious injury of an employee. R. 151.

.J

Kuhni did not contest the Citation and Notification of Penalty (Citation) within the
30 days of receipt, as required by Utah Code § 34A-6-303(1)(b). The Citation
became a final administrative order, not reviewable by any Court or agency. The
Labor Commission's Adjudication Division dismissed the Notice of Contest due to
lack of jurisdiction, a decision that was upheld by the Appeals Board.
Statement of Facts
On February 22, 2016, UOSH issued the Citation against Kuhni. R. 21-37.
UOSH delivered the Citation to Kuhni via Federal Express, an overnight
commercial delivery service, with return receipt requested. R. 21-22. The Citation
was delivered on February 25, 2016 and signed for by "S. Ballow," presumably a
Kuhni employee. 1 R. 21. On the first page of the Citation, the first paragraph states,
in part: "You have the right to contest this Citation. For more information, please

refer to the 'Right to Contest' section of this Citation." R. 23 (emphasis added).
The section entitled "Right to Contest" starts on page three of the Citation and
states:
1

At no point in this litigation has Kuhni presented facts or evidence that it did not receive
the Citation on February 25, 2016. R. 63-67, 94-94, 143-49)

3
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THE RIGHT TO CONTEST THIS CITATION
In accordance with UCA §34A-6-303, you have the right to contest all
or any part of this Citation by filing a written notice of contest with
the Utah Labor Commission Adjudication Division (Adjudication
Division) within 30 calendar days of receipt of this Citation as
follows:

1. Mail notice of contest to the Adjudication Division, P.O. Box 146615,
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615; or
2. Deliver notice of contest to Adjudication Division located in the
Heber Wells Building, 160 East 300 South 3rd floor, Salt Lake City,
Utah; or
3. Electronically submit notice of contest to the Adjudication Division
via email at casefiling@utah.gov; or
4. Fax notice of contest to the Adjudication Division at (801) 530-6333.
If a notice of contest is received, the Utah Labor Commission will
then provide an adjudicative hearing. For further guidance, please
telephone the Adjudication Division at (801) 530-6800. Unless you
inform the Adjudication Division in writing that you intend to
contest the Citation(s) within 30 calendar days after receipt, the
Citation(s) will become a final order of the Utah Labor
Commission and may not be reviewed by any court or agency.
R. 25-26 (emphasis in original).
Kuhni did not contest the Citation within 30 days of receipt of the Citation.
Kuhni filed its Notice of Contest on June 6, 2016, some seventy days after the
Citation became a final administrative order, not subject to review by any court or
agency. UOSH promptly filed a Notice to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which
the Adjudication Division's Administrative Law Judge granted. Kuhni appealed to
4
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the Appeals Board, which upheld the decision of the Adjudication Division. Kuhni
never presented evidence to either the Administrative Law Judge or the Appeals
Board that it did not receive the Citation. There is also a lack of evidence from
,..;;J

Kuhni that the alleged unclear and hidden nature of the contest language in the
Citation caused Kuhni to file an untimely Notice of Contest.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Kuhni' s argument is predicated on two flawed premises. Kuhni first argues
that UOSH did not follow the statutory requirements regarding service of the
Citation because it was sent via commercial carrier service instead of Certified
Mail The result of this alleged failure would be that Kuhni can contest well beyond
the statutory time limit. This claim is unfounded, as UOSH complied with Utah
Code § 34A-6-303(1) when sending the Citation to Kuhni. Kuhni received actual

·.J

notice of the Citation, Kuhni chose, at its own peril, not to file a timely Notice of
Contest. The term "Certified Mail" (with capitalization) is a trademarked term of
the U.S. Postal Service, while "certified mail" has a broader, more general
meeting. Section 34A-6-303( 1) uses the term "certified mail" (without
capitalization), opening the statute to some ambiguity.
In a related argument, Kuhni argues that the email correspondence from a
UOSH Compliance Officer to Kuhni regarding the upcoming deadline to contest
the Citation did not satisfy due process. This contention is a red herring. Kuhni has

5
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not denied that it received the Citation via Federal Express on February 25, 2016.
The admission has made the e-mail issue irrelevant to the Court's present inquiry.
Second, Kuhni 's assertion that the contest language is "buried" in the
Citation and thus unreadable is irrelevant. Under Utah law, UOSH need not show
that Kuhni read or comprehended the Citation. The very first paragraph of the
Citation directs the reader to the heading that one should look to if one is interested
in contesting a Citation. That heading is on page three of the citation, and states in
clear, unambiguous language the process one must follow. Kuhni has not provided
evidence that a representative of the company was confused by the language, nor
was there evidence that Kuhni tried to contest the Citation but was unable to
successfully do so due to any alleged ambiguity. Well-settled Utah case law
establishes the fact that in the administrative setting, UOSH need not prove that
Kuhni read or understood the contest language. If the Citation contained language
indicating how to file a Notice of Contest and the 30-day limit to do so, and Kuhni
received the Citation, then the due process requirements are met.
ARGUMENT
I.

Kuhni failed to timely contest the Citation despite receiving actual
notice.

Kuhni failed to timely contest the Citation despite receiving actual notice.
Kuhni takes an unduly narrow reading of the term "certified mail," especially in
the context of administrative proceedings. It is undisputed that Kuhni received the
6
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Citation on February 25, 2016, and did not file a Notice of Contest within the 30day period following receipt. Under Section 303(1)(b), the Citation thus became a
final order, not reviewable by any court or agency. This issue, of whether a
commercial carrier delivery suffices for "certified mail" of an administrative
citation is one of first impression for Utah appellate courts. Kuhni can provide no
..tJ

Utah case law that supports its argument. The non-binding, marginally persuasive
case law cited by Kuhni can be further distinguished by the facts specific to this
matter.

a.

The term "certified mail" does not require using the U.S.
Post Office's "Certified Mail" system.

Utah Code section 34A-6-303(1)(a) states that a Citation must be sent via
"certified mail." UOSH sent Kuhni its Citation via Federal Express, return receipt
requested. Kuhni argues this doesn't count as "certified mail" under section
303{l)(a) and he therefore never received proper service and his 30-day deadline to
contest the Citation was never triggered. But, contrary to Kuhni's argument, the
term "certified mail" as used in the statute is not limited to the "Certified Mail"
service offered by the United States Post Office.
The Court's objective when interpreting a statute is to give effect to the
legislature's intent. LPI Servs. v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, ,r 11,215 P.3d 135. To
discern the intent of the legislature a court should look to the statute's plain
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language. Id. When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, courts will utilize
a plain language standard of interpretation. State v. Harker, 2010 UT 56, ~ 12, 240
P.3d 780. A statute is ambiguous if duplicative, yet plausible meanings are not
eliminated from possibility. Utah Pub. Employees Ass 'n v. State, 2006 UT 9, ~ 60,
131 P.3d 208 (Parrish, J., concurring). When ambiguities are discovered, a court
may look beyond the statute to legislative history and public policy to discern
intent of a statute's wording. Id. at~ 59.
Acknowledging these rules, the plain language of section 34A-6-303(l)(a)
invites multiple, reasonable interpretations. No one disputes that "Certified Mail"
is a trademarked service of the United States Postal Service. The statutory term
"certified mail," however, has a meaning beyond this trademarked service offered
by the United States Postal Service. Black's Law Dictionary defines "certified
mail" as "Mail for which the sender requests proof of delivery in the form of a
receipt signed by the addressee." Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). As a
verb, Black's Law Dictionary defines "mail" as "To deliver (a letter, package, etc.)
to a private courier service that undertakes delivery to a third person, often within a
specified time." Id. Here the Citation contained proof of delivery in the form of a
receipt signed by a representative of the addressee. R. 21. The proof of delivery
shows that an employee of Kuhni, who was apparently designated by Kuhni to
receive such deliveries, signed for the Citation on February 25, 2016 at 11 :54 a.m.
8
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Id. Accordingly, the Citation was sent by "certified mail" for purposes of section

303(1).
Kuhni' s reliance on the Delaware case Leatherbury v. Greenspun is
misplaced. 939 A.2d 1284 (Del. 2007). In Leatherbury, a plaintiff initiated a state
court action for medical malpractice. Id. at 1286-87. Under Delaware law, a party
"

can toll the relevant statute of limitations for up to ninety days from the applicable
limitations contained in the section by sending a "notice of intent to investigate"
via "certified mail, return receipt requested" to the potential defendant. Id. Per the
statute, the "notice of intent to investigate" was not filed with the court at the time
of service; a copy, along with the Certified Mail receipt is attached to the
complaint at the time of filing to prove the filing was timely. Id. The plaintiffs
attorney sent the notice via Federal Express rather than Certified Mail, return
receipt requested, through the U.S. Postal Service. The case was dismissed as
being filed after the statute of limitations had run. Id. The Supreme Court of
Delaware, in upholding the dismissal, held that the statute at issue imposed an
affirmative duty on the party to act in a particular manner to toll the statute of
limitations, specifically the use of Certified Mail, instead of a commercial courier
service to send the notice. Id. at 1292.
Here, the case can be distinguished because Leatherbury dealt with a private
right of action; a statute of limitations to initiate a tort suit. UOSH's administrative
9
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citation against Kuhni is part of UOSH's statutory charge, protecting Utahns from
unsafe workplaces. The notice and service requirements are more stringent in
private tort suits, like in Leatherbury, than in administrative actions, like a UOSH
Citation. As discussed below, the United States Supreme Court and Federal OSHA
Review Commission have held that when public rights are at stake, technical
deficiencies are excusable. Further, the Utah Supreme Court has held that going
beyond what the statute requires in the service of an administrative action does not
make the service defective.
L

b.

Persuasive Federal OSHA decisions favors the Appeals
Board.

Persuasive federal OSHA decisions favor UOSH's interpretation. In Brock v.
Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253 (1986), the Court held that a failure of an agency to

observe a procedural requirement does not void subsequent agency action,
especially when important public rights are at stake. Id. at 260. The Supreme
Court's holding in Brock was subsequently applied in a federal OSHA case with
similar facts to the matter before this Court. In General Dynamics Corp., Electric
Boat Division, Quonset Point Facility, federal OSHA personally served the

employer with the Citation instead of using certified mail, which the Occupational
Safety and Health Act required. 2 15 BNA OSHC 2122 (1993). The OSHA Review

29 U.S.C. § 659(a) states, in part: "If, after an inspection or investigation, the Secretary
issues a citation under section 658(a) of this title, he shall, within a reasonable time after
2
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Commission held that the service of the Citation by means other than what the
statute required was immaterial, provided the employer received notice. Id. at *4.
Specifically, the OSHA Review Commission held that if an employer receives
.@

actual notice of the citation, the issue of whether service was technically perfect is
not a defect negating service and proper notice to the party that an administrative
action is pending. Id. at *4 (citing Secretary ofLabor v. P & Z Co. et al., 7 BNA
OSHC 1589, 1591 (1979)).
Here, it is uncontroverted that Kuhni received the Citation. Kuhni's own
action in attempting to file its Notice of Contest with the Labor Commission's
Adjudication Division demonstrates this. Further, in the litigation before the
Adjudication Division and the Appeals Board, no evidence was produced, not even
an affidavit by a Kuhni representative, showing that Kuhni did not receive the
Citation on February 25, 2016.

c.

Established Utah case law favors UOSH.

Established Utah case law favors UOSH. In State ex rel. Utah Air Quality
Board v. Truman Mortensen Family_Trust, the Department of Air Quality (DAQ)
attempted to issue a citation against a family trust. 2000 UT 67, 117, 8 P.3d 266.
DAQ sent the original citation via certified mail, only to have it returned. After

the termination of such inspection or investigation, notify the employer by certified mail
of the penalty, if any, proposed to be assessed under section 666 of this title ... "

11
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attempting multiple times to serve the family trust's representative via certified
mail and personal service, the citation was finally accepted by the representative at
a new address learned ofby a DAQ employee. Id.~ 7. In holding that service was
proper, the Utah Supreme Court noted that an agency should not be faulted for
exceeding the legal requirements of the specific administrative service statute. Id.
~

17.
In support of that holding, the Supreme Court in Mortensen cited to its

decision in Anderson v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 839 P.2d 822 (1992).
In Anderson, the Supreme Court held that personal service was not required for
administrative citations, and established a balancing test to determine whether the
method of service used by an agency passes constitutional muster. Id. at 825-26
(citing Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478,484
(1988); Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269, 1273-74 (Utah 1987)). 3 In administrative
actions, the burden on a state agency to provide notice of an administrative
proceeding, such as UOSH, is less onerous than in civil proceedings in a district
court. Anderson, 839 P.2d at 825 (citing Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dep 't, 616
P.2d 598, 602 (Utah 1980) (Hall, J., dissenting)).

The approach cited by the Utah Supreme Court in Carlson is also noteworthy. In
Carlson, the court, in upholding the validity of Utah's nonresident service statute, held
that state's interest in the subject matter of the proceeding is weighed against the parties'
interest in receiving actual notice to determine what form of service would satisfy due
process. 740 P.2d at 1273-74.
3
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Further, the Court in Anderson held that an agency has a significant interest
vJ

in ensuring that a party does not take steps to evade notice. Anderson, 83 9 P.2d at
826. An employer fearing an adverse administrative outcome could simply refuse
to claim mail, and thus avoid service. Id. This approach is evident in Utah Code
section 34A-6-303(1)(b), which provides that a party must commence a Notice of

vJ

Contest within 30 days "from the receipt of the notice issued by the division."
Here, if Kuhni' s interpretation is upheld by this Court, then all an employer
would have to do is to refuse to sign for a Certified Mail envelope from UOSH.
Then, according to Kuhni' s logic, an employer could never be cited, and their time
to contest would never start. Such a result would be illogical. Also, such an
approach goes against prior precedent in Mortensen and Anderson, in which the
Utah Supreme Court did not punish an agency for going beyond statutory
requirements to inform a party of an administrative action.
d.

The e-mail issue is irrelevant.

Kuhni 's argument about the allegedly confusing e-mail is irrelevant. In the
original Motion to Dismiss filed by UOSH, Kuhni argued that in addition to the
Federal Express package, a compliance officer with UOSH had sent e-mail
correspondence to various officers and management-level employees ofKuhni
reminding them of the deadline to file a Notice of Contest. R. 13-43. UOSH made
the argument only as an alternative in case Kuhni responded that it had never
13
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received the Citation. However, from the response in opposition to the motion to
dismiss and onward, Kuhni has never argued that it failed to receive the Citation by
Federal Express on February 25, 2016. As such, the additional steps taken by
UOSH to notify Kuhni, through e-mail correspondence with its officers and
management-level employees, is an irrelevant issue. At best, it demonstrates that
UOSH was going beyond the statute to notify Kuhni, much like the DAQ in
Mortensen.
II.

The language in the Citation concerning the contest procedure is
clear and unambiguous.

The language in the Citation concerning the contest procedure is clear and
unambiguous. Under well settled Utah law, UOSH need not prove that Kuhni read
and understood the Citation language. Even if that were the standard, Kuhni
presented no evidence that its representatives found the contest language confusing
and "buried" in the Citation document.

a.

Utah law is clear that UOSH need not prove Kuhni read
and understood the contents of the Citation.

Utah law is clear that UOSH need not prove Kuhni read and understood the
contents of the Citation. See Mortensen, 2000 UT 67, ~ 17. In Mortensen, the DAQ
issued an administrative citation against a family trust, who owned an apartment
building in Salt Lake City. Id. ,I 6. The administrative citation was five pages long,
and included information on how the family trust could contest the citation and
14
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~

penalties. Id.

,I 6. The contact person for the family trust filed a Notice of Contest

with a Utah state agency other than DAQ, and because the DAQ citation was
therefore not contested, it became final. Id.

,r 8. After the administrative citation

became final, DAQ filed an action in district court to seek enforcement of the
citation. Id.

,r 9. The district court granted summary judgment and the family trust

appealed. Id.

,I 13. On appeal, the family trust alleged that the notice issued by

DAQ was unclear. Id.

,r 15.

In upholding the district court's granting of summary judgment, the Supreme
Court held that an administrative agency is not required to show that the recipient
of a citation read the documents or have actual notice of its existence or contents.

Id.

,r 17 (citing Anderson v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 839 P .2d 822, 826

(Utah 1992)). If the party receives the administrative citation documents, an
agency cannot be charged with inadequate notice if the recipient fails to read or
fully understand its contents. Mortensen, 2000 UT 67, ,r 17.
Here, Kuhni argues that the language of the Citation is unclear and
confusing. In supporting its argument, Kuhni can cite to no relevant Utah case
law, and ignores the Mortensen case, which is controlling on this issue. Kuhni
provided no evidence to support its bare allegations. Even with evidence, however,
the issues raised by Kuhni in the instant case and the family trust in Mortensen are
identical and would have to be rejected.
15
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b.

The case law cited by Kuhni is unsupportive of its position.

The case law cited by Kuhni doesn't support its position. Each case can be
distinguished from the case at hand. Kuhni's reliance on O'Connell v. Norwegian

Caribbean Lines, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 846, 846 (N.D. Ill. 1986) is particularly
problematic. In O'Connell, the notice language at issue was buried in the
"passenger copy" of a cruise line ticket and hidden on a page with other, larger
type. In contrast, the body of the UOSH Citation is composed of the same type size
and font. R. 21-37. The contest language, contained on pages three and four of the
Citation, is clear and conspicuous. R. 25-26. The first paragraph of text in the
Citation includes a sentence directing the reader to the exact section heading where
information on how to file a Notice of Contest is contained. R. 23. The language
on pages three and four of the citation is also in conspicuous font, including the
last section which is in bold, underline font warning the party of the potential
consequences for failure to timely file a Notice of Contest. R. 26.
Kuhni 's reliance on Brody v. Village of Port Chester, is equally unhelpful.
434 F.3d 121 (2nd Cir. 2005). If anything, the holding in Brody favors UOSH. In

Brody, a landowner was challenging various aspects of New York's eminent
domain law regarding condemnation of land by a village for public use. Id. at 127.
The landowner challenged the content of the notice because it lacked any mention
of the 30-day period in which an affected party could challenge the condemnation.
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Id. at 129-30. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the notice violated the

Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution because the village failed to give
explicit notice of the 30-day time limit. Id. at 132.
Here, unlike in Brody, the notice given to Kuhni was explicit. The Citation
issued by UOSH to Kuhni explicitly stated the 30-day period which Kuhni had to
contest the citation. R. 25-26. The Citation states, in bold, underlined print:
Unless you inform the Adiudication Division in writing that you
intend to contest the Citation(s) within 30 calendar days after
receipt, the Citation(s) will become a final order of the Utah
Labor Commission and may not be reviewed by any court or
agency.
R. 26 (emphasis in original).
Nothing could be clearer or more explicit than the language in the Citation
issued by UOSH. Unlike the governmental body in Brody, UOSH states the 30-day
..;)

rJ

J

contest period in the body of the Citation. The first page directs a reader where to
look for the instructions on how to contest a citation. R. 23.
Kuhni also misapplies the holding in In re Millspaugh, 302 B.R. 90, 200,
2013 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003). 4 The holding of Millspaugh once again favors
UOSH. In Millspaugh, a creditor alleged it did not receive proper notice in a
bankruptcy proceeding, when the notice was provided to the creditor by mailing it

4

While citing Millspaugh, the holding quoted by Kuhni is from Varela v. Dynamic
Brokers, Inc. (In re Dynamic Brokers, Inc.), 293 B.R. 489,497 (9th Cir. BAP 2003),
which is cited by the court in Millspaugh.
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to them. Millspaugh, 302 B.R. at 93-94. The language in the notice was clear and
unambiguous. Id. The bankruptcy court concluded that the notice provided the
creditor was sufficient. Id.
Here, Iike in Millspaugh, the notice provided Kuhni was clear and
unambiguous. Kuhni provided no evidence to either the Adjudication Division or
the Appeals Board that a representative of the company was confused by the
language. Further, even if its representative was confused, it is not the standard by
which Utah law evaluates whether administrative notices satisfy due process
requirements. See Mortensen, 200 UT 67, iJ 17.
The final argument made by Kuhni regarding the clarity of the Citation's
notice provisions is that a reasonable person "flipping through the notice" would
not realize the importance of the contest provision. See Kuhni' s Brief at 15. Utah
law, as discussed above, does not require that UOSH show whether Kuhni "flipped
through" or fully read the Citation and comprehended the language included
therein. See Mortensen, 200 UT 67, ,r 17.
For these reasons, the Citation language about the contest procedure was
clear and unambiguous. Kuhni provided no evidence that it found the contest
language "buried" or "confusing." Even if it did, to satisfy due process concerns
with this administrative action, UOSH need not show that an employer read and
comprehended the language in the Citation. Once the Citation was received by
18
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Kuhni, UOSH does not have to prove that Kuhni read the documents. Receipt
satisfies the due process concerns of the U.S. Constitution and the Utah
Constitution.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Appeal Board's decision should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

Isl David M. Wilkins
David M. Wilkins
Assistant Attorney General

Counsel for Respondent Utah Labor
Commission, Occupational Safety and
Health Division
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